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ABS, MBS AND CDO COMPARED: AN EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS 
 
Abstract 
 
The capital market in which asset-backed securities are issued and traded is composed of three 
main categories: ABS, MBS and CDOs. We were able to examine a total number of 3,467 loans (worth 
€548.85 billion) of which 1,102 (worth €163.90 billion) have been classified as ABS. MBS issues represent 
1,783 issues (worth €320.83 billion), and 582 are CDO issues (worth €64.12 billion). We have investigated 
how common pricing factors compare for the main classes of securities. Due to the differences in the assets 
related to these securities, the relevant pricing factors for these securities should differ, too. Taking these 
three classes as a whole, we have documented that the assets attached as collateral for the securities differ 
between security classes, but that there are also important univariate differences to consider. We found that 
most of the common pricing characteristics between ABS, MBS and CDO differ significantly. 
Furthermore, applying the same pricing estimation model to each security class revealed that most of the 
common pricing characteristics associated with these classes have a different impact on the primary market 
spread exhibited by the value of the coefficients. The regression analyses we performed suggest that ABS, 
MBS and CDOs are in fact different instruments, as implied by the differences in impact of the pricing 
factors on the loan spread between these security classes.  
 
Keywords: asset securitization, asset-backed securitisation, bank lending, default risk, risk management, 
spreads, leveraged financing. 
JEL classification: G21, G24, G32 
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 ABS, MBS AND CDO COMPARED: AN EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS 
 
 
 
1. Introduction 
Securitization is a well-established technique developed to finance a collection of assets which by 
their very nature are non-tradable and therefore non-liquid. The central element of an asset securitization 
issue is the fact that repayment depends only or primarily on the assets and cash flows pledged as collateral 
to the issue, and not on the overall financial strengths of the originator (sponsor or parent company). In the 
context of this study, asset securitization is defined as the process in which assets are refinanced in the 
capital market by issuing securities sold to investors by a bankruptcy-remote special purpose vehicle 
(SPV). The primary objective of the SPV is to facilitate the securitization of the assets and to ensure that 
the SPV is established for bankruptcy purposes as a legal entity separate from the seller. Blum and 
DiAngelo [1997] and Choudhry and Fabozzi [2004] mention that the capital market in which these 
securities are issued and traded consists of three main classes: asset-backed securities (ABS), mortgage-
backed securities (MBS), and collateralized debt obligations (CDO). As a rule of thumb, securitization 
issues backed by mortgages are called MBS, and securitization issues backed by debt obligations are called 
CDO1 (see Nomura [2004] and Fitch Ratings [2004]).  Securitization issues backed by consumer-backed 
products — car loans, consumer loans and credit cards, among others — are called ABS (see Moody’s 
Investors Service [2002]). 
Securitization was first introduced on U.S. mortgage markets in the 1970s. The market for 
mortgage-backed securities was boosted by the government agencies that endorsed these securities. In 
1985, securitization techniques that had been developed in the mortgage market were initially applied to a 
class of non-mortgage assets — car loans. After the success of this initial transaction, securitization issues 
were backed by an increasingly diverse and ever-expanding array of assets, including corporate assets such 
as lease receivables and bank assets such as payments associated with corporate loans. Since then, the 
                                                 
1  Ultimately, all debt obligations in a CDO portfolio can be classified as bonds or loans, although both types of debt come in 
various forms with their own unique characteristics. Generally speaking, bonds are fixed income, tradable, and relatively liquid debt 
obligations issued by an entity seeking external capital in debt markets,  sovereign, corporate or financial institution. Loans are less 
fungible instruments in comparison with bonds since they are generally less liquid, and therefore less tradable, and will usually be held 
by a smaller group of investors (lenders) than is the case with bonds (see Fitch Ratings [2004]). 
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 securitization market has grown to become one of the most prominent fixed income sectors in the U.S. and 
in fact one of the fastest evolving sectors around the world. Securitization can be found both in developed 
and in emerging countries (Standard & Poor’s [2006]). 
 Generally speaking, the asset securitization market is composed of asset-backed securities (ABS), 
mortgage-backed securities (MBS) and collateralized debt obligations (CDO). Due to the differences in the 
assets related to these securities, the relevant pricing factors for these securities should differ, too. This 
finding raises the following two questions: How do common pricing factors compare for the main classes 
of securities? And, to what extent are the main classes of securities priced by common factors? The 
purpose of answering these questions is to provide extensive insight into the common pricing 
characteristics associated with these classes, and to elaborate on any substantial differences between them.  
We propose to test the following two hypotheses. The first hypothesis states that the common 
pricing factors differ significantly in value between the main classes of securities. The second hypothesis 
states that the primary market spreads associated with the main security classes are influenced differently 
by common pricing factors.2 In testing the first hypothesis, we used a parametric test - Student’s t-test - to 
compare whether the distribution of the reported values for the security classes are significantly different. 
In testing the second hypothesis, a structural change test was used. The Chow test is a special test for 
structural change, also defined as an econometric test, to determine whether the coefficients in a regression 
model are equal in separate sub-samples (Chow [1960]). We concluded our analysis by examining the 
factors that impact the pricing of the securities. We used an ordinary least squares regression analysis to 
model the magnitude of the relationships between pricing variables and primary market spread, and we 
compared the results with the expectations.  
In the following section, we shall discuss the results of our analyses. The remainder of this article 
is organized as follows. In Section 2, background information and our hypotheses are discussed. Section 3 
describes our data. In Section 4, we discuss our univariate analysis. In Section 5, we turn to our regression 
analysis and explore each common pricing variable in our high-information sample. Section 5 also deals 
                                                 
2  It is important to note that this study is based on issuance spreads. Secondary market spreads are not preferred because it is 
loan spreads at issuance that reflect actual loan prices,  rather than estimations derived from pricing matrices or dealers’ quotes. 
Issuance spreads are a more accurate measure not only of the actual cost of debt but also of the risk premium demanded by investors.  
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 with the common pricing features for different classes of asset securitization issues.  Section 6 concludes 
this article. 
 
 
2.  Background Information and Hypotheses 
Choudhry and Fabozzi [2004] mention that the capital market in which the securities are issued 
and traded is composed of three main, distinct categories: ABS, MBS, and CDOs. As a rule of thumb, 
securitization issues backed by mortgages are called MBS, securitization issues backed by debt obligations 
are called CDO, and securitization issues backed by consumer-backed products are called ABS. 
 
II. A.  Hypothesis concerning differences in common pricing factors related to ABS, MBS, and CDOs 
Due to the differences in the assets related to these securities, the relevant pricing factors for these 
securities should differ, too. This finding raises the following question: how do common pricing factors 
compare for the main classes of securities? The purpose of answering this question is to provide extensive 
insight into the common pricing characteristics associated with these classes, and to elaborate on any 
substantial differences between them. We hypothesize that the common pricing factors differ significantly 
in value between the main classes of securities. In testing hypothesis 1 we used a parametric test - Student’s 
t-test - to compare whether the distributions of the reported values for the security classes are significantly 
different.  
 
II. B.  Hypothesis related to the extent to which the main classes of securities are priced by common 
factors 
The second research question is: to what extent are the main classes of securities priced by 
common factors? In pricing securities, the pricing characteristics may have a different impact on the 
primary market spread exhibited by the value of the coefficients. Also, the degree of the impact on the 
spread could differ per security class. Thus, for statistical analyses, the problem is twofold. Various 
different variables determine spreads, and it may well be  that the impact of these variables on the spread is 
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 different among and between security classes. According to basic statistics, relevant pricing variables can 
be identified by their statistical significance, while the equality of the impact of each variable can be 
determined by comparing coefficient values. Overall, we hypothesize that the primary market spreads 
associated with the main security classes are influenced differently by common pricing factors. 
A structural change test was used for hypothesis 2. The Chow test is a special test for structural 
change, also defined as an econometric test to determine whether the coefficients in a regression model are 
equal in separate sub-samples. In his paper, G.C. Chow [1960] states that "the standard F-test for the 
equality of two sets of coefficients in linear regression models" is called a Chow test (see Davidson and 
MacKinnon [1993] for an explanation).  In brief, the Chow test is an econometric test to determine whether 
the coefficients in two linear regressions on different data are equal (Chow [1960]).3 
Having documented to what extent the pricing variables for the different classes of securities show 
significant differences, we concluded our empirical analyses by examining the factors that impact the 
pricing of the securities. We used an ordinary least squares regression analysis to model the magnitude of 
the relationships between pricing variables and the primary market spread, and we compared the results 
with the expectations as outlined in Section 3 below. Should hypothesis 2 be rejected, a regression test 
would have to be run on one sample only in order to determine the pricing variables. Should hypothesis 2 
be accepted, examining the coefficients will allow us to determine pricing variables for each security class 
separately. 
 
 
3. Data Description 
The principal data source used in this study is formed by the data provided in Structured Finance 
International Magazine, published by Euromoney Institutional Investor Plc. Structured Finance 
International (hereafter: SFI) is recognized as one of the world’s leading journals and news sources by the 
foremost market practitioners — issuers, investors, bankers, and other service providers. In particular, SFI 
                                                 
3  The issue of the variance of μ being equal in the two groups is a subtle one since the assumption of equality of variances 
manifests itself only in how the pooled coefficient estimates are manufactured. 
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 provides data on the volume and nature of securitization activities, as well as accurate and transparent 
league tables on the global capital markets spanning Asia, the Middle East, Europe, Africa and the 
Americas. This database contains detailed historical information on virtually the entire population of 
securitization of non-U.S. assets from January 1, 1999 through March 31, 2005.   
Our sample contains information on 2,427 ABS issues (worth €363.19 billion), 3,650 MBS issues 
(worth €715.21 billion) and 2,504 CDO issues (worth €316.72 billion), and we refer to this as our “full 
sample.” Because the unit of observation is a single issue (single loan tranche), multiple issues (multiple 
loan tranches) from the same transaction appear as separate observations in our database – 765 ABS 
transactions (containing 2,427 issues), 760 MBS transactions (containing 3,650 issues), and 514 CDO 
transactions (containing 2,504 issues). Although it is comprehensive in many ways, our sample has two 
limitations for our current purposes. First, it provides detailed information on securitization transactions 
limited to non-U.S. assets and dated after 1998. Second, some issues may have incomplete loan 
characteristics, which as a result will reduce our sample in the univariate analysis (to answer hypothesis 1) 
and in the regression analysis (to answer hypothesis 2).  
Since we wished to compare the common pricing characteristics associated with the main security 
classes and investigate to what extent the main classes of securities are priced by common factors, we 
selected from our sample those issues which have comparable pricing data expressed. This procedure has 
yielded a sub-sample of 3,467 loans (worth €548.85 billion) of which 1,102 (worth €163.90 billion) have 
been classified as ABS.  MBS issues represent 1,783 issues (worth €320.83 billion), and 582 are CDO 
issues (worth €64.12 billion).4 We refer to this set as our “high-information sample”. Our high-information 
sample includes issues with four A.) default and recovery risk characteristics (credit rating, loan to value, 
maturity, credit enhancement); seven B.) marketability characteristics (size of the tranche, size of 
transaction, number of tranches, number of lead managers, number of credit rating agencies, whether the 
issue is retained or not, and finally type of interest rate), and one C.) systemic risk characteristic (currency 
risk).   
                                                 
4  We excluded all issues associated to sub-prime mortgages in our sample. 
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 On average, we document a relatively high survival rate from the full sample to the high-
information sample (51.6% for ABS, 53.6% for MBS and 36.0% for CDO). This is illustrated in Panels A, 
B and C of Exhibit  1. Each Panel represents the characteristics of the full sample compared with the high-
information sample by security class. 
****Insert Exhibit 1 about here**** 
 
A comparison between the common variables in the full sample and the high-information sample 
in Panels A, B and C reveals that the high-information issues are not dissimilar to their counterparts in 
terms of loan spread, A.) default and recovery risk (credit rating, loan to value, maturity, credit 
enhancement), B.) marketability (size of the tranche, size of transaction, number of tranches, number of 
lead managers, number of credit rating agencies, retained interest, type of interest rate), and finally C.) 
systemic characteristic (currency risk).5 So, we assume that any empirical results derived from the high-
information samples can be generalized to the larger population including all issues. 
A discussion of these common pricing characteristics (and expected impact on primary market) 
will follow below.  
 
3.1 Primary Market Spread 
The loan spread (primary market spread) represents the price for the risk associated with the 
security on the basis of information at the time of issue. In our sample, the spread is defined as the margin 
yielded by the security at issue above a corresponding benchmark. The spread is presented in basis points. 
For floating rate issues, the spread (in basis points) is reported as a quoted margin above the Interbank 
Offered Rate. For fixed rate issues, the spread is represented in basis points over the closest benchmark of 
matching maturity.  
 
 
                                                 
5  For transaction size and number of tranches, we calculated the average and standard deviation - taking into account 
transaction size and number of tranches for each transaction individually. 
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 3.2 Expected Default and Recovery Risk Characteristics 
The first set of explanatory variables affecting loan spread consists of default and recovery risk 
(group A.). The following factors used here represent default and recovery risk characteristics: credit 
rating, loan to value, time to maturity and credit enhancement. A discussion of these variables (and their 
expected impact on primary market) will follow below.  
The credit rating of a loan issue is an evaluation of the likelihood of a borrower defaulting on a 
loan.  By including credit rating in our analysis, we can analyze the impact of default on a securitization 
issue. A better bond rating should result in lower spreads.6 Credit rating should capture the difference in 
both issuers’ creditworthiness and bonds’ seniority and security structures. Because we needed a consistent 
rating classification scheme, we used the ratings scales as shown in Exhibit 2. This classification scheme 
consists of 21 rating scales for three rating agencies: Fitch, Moody’s, and Standard and Poor’s. As part of 
the process, we collected the credit rating class at the time of issuance. 7 
****Insert Exhibit 2 about here**** 
 
Needing a consistent rating classification, we used a set of fifteen credit-rating dummy variables 
that correspond to the credit rating of the issue - CR=1, CR=2, CR=3, CR=4, CR=5, CR=6, ….., CR=15, 
that correspond to credit rating: Aaa/AAA, Aa1/AA+, Aa2/AA, Aa3/AA-, A1/A+, A2/A, ….., B2/B. Credit 
rating classifications above B2/B (CR>15) are not available. A word of caution is needed here, as it is 
important to remember that the rating scales are inverse scales, so that spread increases as rating decreases.  
Given our desire to control for credit protection of all positions subordinate to a loan tranche, we 
included the loan to value ratio (cumulative level of subordination) in our analysis. In an asset 
securitization transaction, the senior-subordinated structure splits cash flows into many classes of notes, 
with each class, or loan tranche, having absolute priority in the cash flow over the more junior classes. This 
structure is layered, so that each position benefits from the credit protection of all the positions 
                                                 
6  This notion is empirically supported by Elton, Gruber, Agrawal and Mann [2001], and also by John, Lynch and Puri 
[2003], among others, who all find credit rating statistically significant. 
 
7  If a loan tranche had multiple ratings, we calculated the average of the given values as the rating classification, rounding 
off to the nearest absolute value.  
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 subordinated to it. Typical subordination levels are expressed as a percentage of the transaction’s initial 
principal balance.  
We shall illustrate this with the following example. Using a capital structure of two tranches - 
Class B Junior of €40 million and Class A Senior of €60 million - the originator might sell only the Class A 
tranche. The investor would bear the risk that losses on the underlying portfolio exceed the cumulative 
subordination level of 40% (€40 million divided by a total of €100 million). If losses reached 40%, the 
Class B Junior tranche would be wiped out. Between 40% and 100%, each Euro loss on the underlying 
portfolio translates into an equal Euro loss for the holder of the Class A Senior tranche. 
To compute the subordination levels, we manually calculated the subordination level for each loan 
tranche in each transaction that contains more than one tranche. If a transaction contains one tranche only, 
the cumulative subordination level is 100% and no subordination exists.8 Also, the size of all tranches in a 
transaction had to be available; otherwise the subordination level could not be calculated. We finally 
calculated the loan-to-value ratio as the value of a loan cumulated according to the priority structure 
divided by the total issue amount of the transaction. The expected coefficient sign is negative, as loans with 
a lower loan-to-value ratio (junior tranches) have a lower expected recovery rate in case of default than 
loans with a higher loan-to-value ratio (senior tranches) and therefore require a higher return.  
Time to maturity is measured in years and affects the bond’s default risk premium (Merton 
[1974]).9 We calculated the time to maturity as the difference between the legal maturity date of the issue 
and the launch date.10 Three maturity dummy variables were constructed based on the maturity of the issue: 
‘lowmaturity’, ‘medmaturity’ and ‘highmaturity’. Lowmaturity is 1 if the issue matures in less than 5 years, 
medmaturity is 1 if the issue matures between 5 and 15 years, highmaturity is 1 if the loan matures after 15 
                                                 
8  If the securitization is structured as a “pass-through,” there is only one class of bonds, and all investors participate 
proportionally in the net cash flows from the assets. 
 
9  One should not confuse time to maturity of the issue with weighted average life since weighted average life deals in 
particular with the sensitivity of the value of the loan towards changes in interest rates. Unfortunately, since weighted average life is 
based on assumptions specified at issuance concerning prepayments defaults and other relevant variables, this variable was 
unavailable in our sample.   
 
10  Legal maturity is defined as the date before which a specific tranche of securities must be repaid in order not be in default. 
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 years. The variables’ expected signs cannot be determined clearly from either the theoretical or the 
empirical literature.11    
In our sample, issues with credit enhancement refer to issues with a third-party guarantee in the 
form of an insurance policy issued by one of the monoline insurance companies. Dummy variables take the 
value of 1 if a loan is guaranteed and zero otherwise. These providers guarantee (or wrap) the principal and 
interest payments of an issue. For each issue, we collected information whether or not the issue is 
guaranteed. According to Fabozzi and Roever [2003], for each class of securities in a given structure, the 
issuer evaluates the trade-off associated with the cost of enhancement versus the reduction in yield required 
to sell the security. Thus, a negative coefficient is expected.  
 
3.2 Expected Marketability Characteristics 
 The second set of explanatory variables affecting loan spread is marketability of the loan (group 
B.). The following factors used here represent marketability: loan size, transaction size, number of 
tranches, number of lead managers, number of credit rating agencies, whether or not the issue is retained, 
and finally type of interest rate. A discussion of these variables (and their expected impact on primary 
market) will follow below.  
The loan size is the natural log of the face value of the loan tranche.12 A higher issue amount is 
generally believed to improve, ceteris paribus, secondary market liquidity. Larger issues are likely to be 
associated with less uncertainty, to be more liquid, and to have more public information available about 
them than smaller offerings. Hence, we would expect larger issues to have lower spreads. Thus, we would 
also expect to find a negative impact of transaction size (the natural log of the transaction issue Euro 
equivalent amount) on the spread.13  
                                                 
11  Helwege and Turner [1998] argue that a positive coefficient is expected as longer maturity bonds require, ceteris paribus, a 
higher spread. On the other hand, Sarig and Warga [1989] find a negative relationship between maturity and loan spread. 
 
12  The currency of the issue has to be analyzed carefully since the value of a securitization issue is often stated in foreign 
currency. In order to include the issues denominated in different currencies in the analysis, we converted them into Euros. The 
exchange rate used is the average rate of the year the issue was launched. This information was obtained from the Nederlandsche 
Bank.  
 
13  Transaction size is the face value sum of all  tranches for a given transaction. 
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 Each transaction is divided into one or more tranches. For every issue in a given transaction, we 
documented the number of tranches for each transaction. We included number of tranches to analyze the 
impact of tranching on the spread. Tranching could allow the issuer to take advantage of market factors 
such as greater investor sophistication and heterogeneous screening skills related to asymmetric 
information. Thus, a negative coefficient of number of tranches is expected.14 
The number of lead managers represents the number of financial institutions participating in the 
loan issuance management group. These include the lead manager, any co-lead manager, book runners and 
co-managers. We collected this information in order to analyze any differences in syndicate.  A negative 
coefficient sign is expected, as this would indicate that a larger syndicate is able to achieve, ceteris paribus, 
a better result or lower loan spread.  
The number of rating agencies represents the number of rating agencies involved in rating the 
issue. Since many larger credit rating agencies offer credit rating advisory services, this could create a 
potential conflict of interest, as the credit rating agency may feel obligated to provide the issuer with that 
given rating if the issuer follows its advice on structuring the offering  (The Bond Market Association 
[2002]). Many institutional investors now prefer a debt issuance to have at least three ratings. Thus, a 
negative coefficient sign is expected, as this would indicate that a larger number of credit rating agencies 
involved in rating the issue is able to achieve, ceteris paribus, a more accurate rating, thereby reducing the 
potential conflict of interest and lowering the loan spread.  
The retained subordinated interest is a beneficial interest in a securitization transaction set up by 
the originator. It absorbs the first losses on the whole loan and is inferior or in secondary position with 
regard to collection in the event of default (Childs, Ott and Riddiough [1996]). In theory, it should make no 
difference whether or not the junior tranche is retained by the originator, as it shouldn’t affect the 
probability of loss. However, the interest retained by the originator may signal a good quality associated 
with the underlying assets, leading to “investor comfort.”  Nevertheless, no clear theoretical a priori 
conclusion can be drawn as far as the expected coefficient sign of this variable is concerned. Other 
                                                 
14  Firla-Cuchra and Jenkinson [2006] found a consistent and significant negative relationship between the number of tranches 
and the launch spread after controlling for credit rating. 
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 elements remaining equal, a negative sign would indicate that the originator is able to translate original 
ownership through a lower spread. On the other hand, a positive coefficient would indicate that the issue 
retained by the originator is related to an increase in spread.  
We included type of interest rate to analyze the impact of fixed and floating interest rates on the 
spread. We collected information on whether the issue had a rate fixed for the life of the issue, or had an 
interest rate that fluctuated depending on the base interest rate (floating rate issue). We constructed two 
dummy variables based on the type of interest rate. Fixed is a dummy variable taking the value of 1 if a 
loan is fixed–price, and zero otherwise. Floating is a dummy variable taking the value of 1 if a loan is 
floating–price, and zero otherwise. Since the interest rate on a fixed-rate issue does not change during the 
life of the loan, these notes do not fluctuate and are typically protected to avoid the risk of rising interest 
rates. We expect borrowers to raise funds at a higher spread through fixed-priced issues rather than through 
floating-priced issues. For this reason, a positive sign is expected for a fixed rate issue.  Floating is the 
omitted category. However, statistical significance could be poor as the risk inherent to rising interest rates 
is already reflected in the rating of the loan issue.  
 
3.4  Expected Systemic Characteristics 
Systemic risk should control for the risk presented by a country where the assets are located and to 
pierce the local currency of a specific country that is not already incorporated into an issue rating. Currency 
risk is defined as the risk that is run if the currency in which the loan is repaid differs from the borrower's 
home country currency. The dummy variable takes the value of 1 if a loan is exposed to currency risk and 
zero otherwise. We should expect issues exposed to currency risk have higher spreads than issues not 
exposed to currency risk.  
All independent variables are discrete, with the exception of loan to value, maturity, loan tranche 
size and transaction size, all of which are continuous. The univariate analysis is presented in the next 
section. 
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 4. Univariate Analysis 
This section investigates how common pricing factors compare for the main classes of securities. 
The purpose is to provide extensive insight into the common pricing characteristics associated with these 
classes, and to elaborate on any substantial differences between them. We hypothesize that the common 
pricing factors differ significantly in value between the main classes of securities.  We used a parametric 
test - Student’s t-test - to compare whether the distribution of the values reported for the security classes are 
significantly different, and thus whether the common pricing factors do in fact significantly differ in value 
between them.  
****Insert Exhibit  3 about here**** 
 
The numbers in Panel C of Exhibit 3 are t-statistics, and almost all of the pair-wise comparisons indicate 
statistically significant differences between the common pricing variables associated with the security 
classes ABS, MBS and CDO.  These differences may explain why the capital market distinguishes between 
these classes of securities. Below, we shall discuss the main findings included in Exhibit 3.15 
The relative pricing of asset securitization issues shows that average (median) spreads are 
statistically and significantly lower for MBS, with 73.9 basis points (45.0 basis points) than they are for 
ABS, with 99.2 basis points (50.0 basis points), and CDO, with 162.4 basis points (95.0 basis points). 
Furthermore, CDOs are more than twice as likely to have currency risk involved compared with MBS 
(39.8% versus 15.9%), and even more than three times compared with ABS (39.8% versus 13.3%).  This 
finding suggests that CDOs more frequently contain a mismatch between the originators’ home country 
currencies and the currency of loan repayment. One obvious interpretation is that the collateral of CDOs is 
more diverse and is frequently originated in multiple countries, as compared with the underlying assets 
related to ABS and MBS.  
MBS and ABS on average tend to be less risky than their CDO counterparts. This is also 
confirmed by the credit rating class. Since credit rating and spread tend to have an inverse relationship, it is 
                                                 
15  Because data are available for only a limited number of observations, sample sizes occasionally drop for some variables. 
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 obvious that the average credit rating class for MBS (4.0) and for ABS (3.9) is significantly lower than the 
credit rating for CDOs (4.6). Most observers would have predicted that MBS loans have lower spreads, 
since loan repayment is frequently backed by large amounts of commercial or residential properties that are 
relatively liquid and make the issue less risky. CDO collaterals, however, consist of bonds, loans or similar 
assets, and are considered to be relatively illiquid. Additionally, if we compare the average spread exhibited 
by ABS, MBS and CDO in our study with the average spread exhibited by all syndicated loans in the study 
by Kleimeier and Megginson [2001], we notice that ABS (99.2 basis points) and MBS (73.9 basis points) 
have a lower average spread in comparison with the spread for all syndicated loans (134 basis points).16 
CDOs (162.4 basis points) have a higher average spread in comparison with the average of all syndicated 
loans, and reflect higher perceived risk. On the one hand, spread level and credit rating class provide direct 
evidence of the riskiness of an asset securitization issue, but on the other hand the number of rating 
agencies and the number of managers involved also provide (indirect) evidence of the riskiness of the loan 
— or at least an indication of the difficulty to underwrite the issue. The average number (median) of 
participating lead managers for MBS is 1.6 (1) and is significantly larger than the average of 1.4 (1) for 
ABS and 1.2 (1) for CDOs. CDOs have the lowest average number of arranging banks, which could be 
explained by the fact that a number of CDOs exclusively involve their own active asset managers with the 
purpose of managing the underlying portfolio.17 The need for a higher number of arranging banks would 
therefore be lower.  
MBS have an average of 4.1 (median 4.0) rating agencies involved, which is significantly higher 
than the 3.8 (3.0) agencies for ABS and 3.7 (3.0) agencies for CDOs. It is difficult to explain why MBS 
issues have such a relatively high number of agencies involved, since these account for a large share of the 
capital markets (Nomura [2006]). One possible explanation could be the prepayment risk related to the 
                                                 
16  Kleimeier and Megginson [2001] compare the characteristics of a sample of 4,956 project finance loans (worth $634 
billion) to comparable samples of non-project finance loans, all of which are drawn from a comprehensive sample of 90,784 
syndicated loans (worth $13.2 trillion). All syndicated loans include: project finance loans, corporate control loans, capital structure 
loans, fixed asset-based loans, and general corporate purpose loans. 
 
17  Some CDOs, however, have no portfolio manager and no substitution or trading of the underlying assets. For example, in a 
static CDO deal the collateral manager is not allowed to trade the securities in the asset pool.  
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 underlying collateral. Because of this risk, MBS issues tend to be more difficult to rate, and more rating 
agencies need to be involved to convince investors to participate in the MBS. 
The MBS class exhibits the largest average (median) transaction size of €800.0 million (€600.5 
million) followed by CDO and ABS with an average (median) transaction size of €616.1 million (€358.8 
million) and €475.1 million (€331.4 million) respectively.  The cumulative subordination level in each 
transaction is layered, so that each position benefits from the credit protection of all the positions 
subordinated to it. We found that ABS has the highest average (median) loan-to-value level with 18.0% 
(6.7%), followed by CDO with 17.8% (10.0%) and MBS with 13.2% (4.0%). Additionally, we found that 
the average of the cumulative subordination level is higher compared with the median across all classes. 
This could mean that tranching (splitting cash flows into separate loan tranches) is more extensive at the 
senior level of a securitization structure.  
MBS exhibit the largest average (median) loan tranche size, amounting to €209.6 million (€48.2 
million): an average €82.4 million more than the average tranche size exhibited by CDOs, and €59.3 
million more than the average loan tranche size exhibited by ABS. All are significantly different. Average 
MBS tranche size, however, is relatively large: similar in size to an average loan tranche of all syndicated 
credits. Kleimeier and Megginson [2001] report that all syndicated loans have an average (median) tranche 
size of $203 million ($70 million). Since ABS and CDO report an average (median) tranche size of €150.3 
(€40.5 million) and €127.2 (€25.0 million) respectively, these tranche sizes tend to be substantially smaller 
than the average of all syndicated credits. This is reinforced by the observation that in a typical 
securitization transaction more classes of tranches are issued. They participate differently in the asset cash 
flows, and thus reduce the size of each loan tranche. In a typical ABS transaction, for example, the average 
number (median) of tranches per transaction is 3.2 (2.0): higher than the average number of 1.7 tranches 
for all syndicated credits. Closer analysis reveals that the assets underlying an asset securitization 
transaction may benefit from tranching to a larger degree, because of the screening ability inherent to a 
more homogeneous asset pool (DeMarzo [2005]): the more information-sensitive (regarding screening 
ability) the underlying assets are, the greater the benefits become (see Riddiough [1997]).     
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  An MBS tranche of average size matures just over 27.5 years, which is a long period if we 
compare this with the average 11.3 and 15.1 years for ABS and CDO respectively. Still, the asset 
securitization issues, as indicated by the standard deviation, exhibit significant heterogeneity with respect to 
maturity. For example, average standard deviation for maturity of MBS is 14.6 years; for ABS this is 9.8 
years, and for CDOs the standard deviation reports 18.4 years. Mortgages in general are considered to have 
a long maturity. For instance, the most common type of residential mortgage loan is a 30-year loan. The 
difference can be explained by the fact that certain types of assets underlying an asset securitization 
structure lend themselves more easily for issues with longer maturity levels. In general, the payoff profile 
of the underlying assets is closely related to the maturity of the issues.  
Finally, ABS are almost four times more likely to be fixed rate credits than MBS (41.4% versus 
13.7%), and almost twice as likely to be fixed rate credits compared to CDOs (41.4% versus 26.1%). 
Locking in a specific rate, in general, eliminates a major source of cash flow uncertainty. In particular, one 
would expect MBS to have a relatively higher percentage of fixed-rate issues since MBS report the highest 
average maturity (27.5 years) and the issuance of fixed rate securities would eliminate a major source of 
cash flow uncertainty inherent to a longer maturity. Nevertheless, floating-rate issues tend to offer more 
flexibility due to the prepayment option in most mortgage loans: mortgage loan borrowers generally have 
the right to prepay their loans at any time without penalty. For example, when interest rates increase, 
mortgage loan borrowers may be given an incentive to repay their loan. The originator is able to use these 
loan repayments to redeem the principal of the outstanding securities, thereby eliminating a major source of 
cash flow uncertainty. As a result, the need is reduced to issue fixed rate securities in the first place.   
Before proceeding to Section 5, in which we analyze the impact of the common pricing features on 
primary market spread by security class, we should briefly summarize the results of our univariate 
comparison. This section investigates how common pricing factors compare for the main classes of 
securities. The purpose is to provide insight into the common pricing characteristics associated with these 
classes, and to elaborate on any substantial differences between them. We found that most of the common 
pricing characteristics between ABS, MBS and CDO in fact differ significantly, and therefore we accept 
the hypothesis which states that the common pricing factors among the main classes of securities do differ 
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 significantly in value.18 Taking the classes as a whole, we have documented that the assets attached as 
collateral for the securities differ between security classes, but that there are also important univariate 
differences to consider. We documented, for example, that:  
(1) ABS and MBS on average tend to be less risky than their CDO counterparts. Both 
MBS and ABS have a significantly lower spread, a significantly higher credit rating 
and a significantly lower currency risk in comparison with CDOs;  
(2)  MBS are far more likely to be floating rate rather than fixed rate credits in 
comparison with ABS and CDOs; 
(3) MBS show a significantly larger transaction size than ABS and CDOs; 
(4) MBS have significantly longer maturity levels than ABS and CDOs. 
The payoff profile of the mortgages lends itself more easily for issues with longer maturity, and 
therefore MBS report almost twice the average maturity in comparison with ABS and CDOs. In addition, 
we also found support for the assumption that assets underlying an asset securitization transaction may 
benefit from tranching to a larger degree in comparison with all syndicated credits. This could be explained 
by the screening ability inherent to a more homogeneous asset pool. Nevertheless, this result merits future 
study. Overall, our results indicate that the common pricing characteristics differ significantly in value 
between the main security classes, and therefore we would expect the impact on pricing to be security-
specific. A natural follow-up of this study would be an investigation into the extent to which the main 
security classes are priced by common factors.  
 
 
5. Regression Analysis 
This section investigates to what extent the main classes of securities are priced by common 
factors. Its purpose is to analyze the impact of the common pricing features on primary market spread by 
security class. We hypothesized that the primary market spreads associated with the main security classes 
                                                 
18  Exhibit 3, Panel C shows that all of the pair-wise comparisons indicate statistically significant differences at the 5% level, 
except: credit rating class between ABS and MBS, loan to value between ABS and CDO, credit enhancement between MBS and 
CDO, transaction size between ABS and CDO, and finally retained interest between ABS and CDO, and MBS and CDO. 
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 are influenced differently by common pricing factors. To test hypothesis 2 we analyzed the Chow statistics, 
which we shall briefly explain in four steps. First, one ordinary least squares regression was run on the 
common pricing variables (independent variables) and the primary market spread (dependent variable), 
under the assumption that all security classes have the same explanatory variables. We adjusted for 
heteroscedasticity using the methodology proposed by White [1980].19 Second, coefficients from separate 
regressions were obtained for each security class, and thus we ran three regressions: one for ABS, one for 
MBS and one for CDO. Three, based on the residual sum of changes of each regression, an F-test of 
structural change could then be computed (also called a Chow test). In step four, hypothesis 2 was to be 
rejected if the computed F value remained smaller than its critical level, and it was to be accepted if the F 
value exceeded the critical level. Should hypothesis 2 be rejected, one regression only will then be run to 
determine the impact of the pricing variables on the primary market spread. Should hypothesis 2 be 
accepted, we shall examine the relationship between the pricing variables and the spread for each security 
class separately for comparison.  
The specification of the initial model is: 
 
SPREADi =  α + ß1 CREDIT RATINGi + ß2 LOAN TO VALUEi + ß3 MATURITYi + ß4 
ENHANCEMENTi + ß5 LOAN SIZEi + ß6 TRANSACTION SIZEi + ß7 # 
TRANCHESi + ß8 # LEAD MANAGERSi + ß9 # RATING AGENCIESi + ß10 
RETAINEDi + ß11 TYPE INTEREST RATEi + ß12 CURRENCY RISKi + ß13 
YEAR OF ISSUEi + ß14 CURRENCYi + εi            (1) 
 
The following control variables have been included as additional independent variables in the 
regressions.  
CURRENCY dummies are included because loan issues in our sample are denominated in several 
currencies: British pound,  U.S. dollar, Euro, Yen and Australian dollar. Each dummy variable is 1 if the 
                                                 
19  The Chow test assumes well-behaved error terms to test significant differences in the estimated equations. 
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 loan issue is denominated in the corresponding currency and zero otherwise. These variables should capture 
investors’ currency preferences. 
YEAR OF ISSUE. We constructed seven dummy variables based on the year of the issue – 
YEAR=1, YEAR=2, YEAR=3, YEAR=4, YEAR=5, YEAR=6 and YEAR=7 that correspond to 1999, 
2000, 2001, 2002, 2003, 2004, 2005. Their value is 1 if the loan was issued in the corresponding year, zero 
if not.  These variables should capture the variations in bond market conditions. 
 
5.1  Chow test 
We used a Chow test to investigate whether the primary market spreads associated with the main 
security classes are influenced differently by common pricing factors. The Chow test is a particular test for 
structural change, also defined as an econometric test, to determine whether the coefficients in a regression 
model are the same in separate sub-samples. Exhibit  4 shows to what extent the main classes of securities 
are priced by common factors.  
****Insert Exhibit  4 about here**** 
 
Hypothesis 2 can be rejected when the computed F value remains smaller than its critical level, 
and will be accepted when the F value exceeds the critical value. The Chow test statistics in Exhibit  4 are 
all higher than the critical levels, so we must accept hypothesis 2. Thus, the primary market spreads 
associated with the main security classes are influenced differently by common pricing factors.20 Following 
our analysis, we may conclude here that our results confirm current market views: namely that ABS, MBS 
and CDOs are distinct financial instruments.  
In the following section, we shall discuss the relationship between pricing variables and primary 
market spread for each security class separately for comparison.  
 
 
                                                 
20  The test statistic follows the F distribution with k and N1 + N2 − 2k degrees of freedom.  
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 5.2  Regression results 
In this subsection, we examine the determinants of primary market spreads using an ordinary least 
squares regression framework, with spread as the dependent variable and the common pricing factors as the 
independent variables. Initial regression results of the three models are reported in Exhibit 5. F statistics on 
whether coefficients are jointly different from zero as well as adjusted R2 are reported at the bottom end of 
the exhibit.  
****Insert Exhibit 5 about here**** 
Overall, the model performs relatively well. The adjusted R square is just over 0.76 for our ABS 
sample: 0.82 for MBS and 0.82 for our CDO sample respectively. This indicates that the model explains a 
significant proportion of the spread over the sample period.   
Exhibit  5 shows that almost all RATING dummies (2-13) are statistically significant, most 
frequently at the 1% level. The pattern of most credit rating dummy variables indicates that spreads rise 
when ratings worsen. These results are as predicted, and make intuitive sense. However, the impact of a 
typical credit rating on the spread differs substantially from security class to security class. For example, 
the average spread increase for CDOs relative to MBS is substantially lower across the higher rating 
categories (2, 3 and 4), and dramatically higher across the lower rating categories (5-13) in Regressions #2 
and #3. One interpretation of this finding is that CDOs may be more exposed to higher levels of distressed 
assets, dramatically increasing the risk from the higher to the lower rating categories. Overall, almost all 
rating dummies are statistically significant with the expected sign, but do not report very similar 
coefficients for the three sub-samples. Clearly, credit rating does not provide an unbiased estimate to 
determine spreads. The lesson to be learned here is that it remains extremely difficult to compare credit 
ratings and the associated additional premiums for the different security classes. For instance, regression 
analysis shows that an average CDO that has been rated Aa2 has its premium lying 22.98 basis points 
higher than a similar issue rated AAA, while an average ABS rated Aa2 has its premium lying 38.57 basis 
points higher. In fact, it turns out that these differences become bigger as credit ratings deteriorate.    
We included two types of credit enhancement in our regression analysis: external provided by one 
of the monocline insurance companies and internal through a retained interest by the originator. The credit 
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 enhancement dummy variable is significant and positive for MBS issues only, which is a highly surprising 
result. Apparently, investors associate an additional risk premium with MBS if the transaction includes 
credit enhancement – as opposed to similar issues without enhancement. While finding a consistently 
insignificant, negative relationship between the RETAINED dummy variable and the spread is not 
surprising, the dispersion in coefficient values definitely is. CDOs exhibit the highest spread differentials as 
a result of this guarantee. We found that CDOs are the most sensitive to the retained dummy variable, 
reducing the spread by an average of 104 basis points, be it insignificant. ABS and MBS both report small 
and insignificant values.  One interpretation is that CDOs take advantage of the yield differential between 
the assets in a CDO portfolio and the cost of funding the CDO. These structures typically use a much wider 
range of collateral in comparison with ABS and MBS, including for example a combination of leveraged 
loans, high-yield bonds, and investment grade corporate bonds. Since these assets are often already in 
default, or are traded at prices that are considered distressed levels —  particularly in the past couple of 
years  — the increased market volatility of these assets produces structures with greater credit enhancement 
potential for the long-term investor. As a result, the impact of credit enhancement on the primary market 
spread tends to be higher for CDOs in comparison with ABS and MBS, after controlling for credit rating. 
In other words, CDOs should benefit to a larger degree from the additional credit enhancement, because of 
the riskiness of the underlying assets.  
LOAN SIZE behaves differently in our samples. Whereas loan spread and loan size are 
significantly and positively related for ABS issues, they have an insignificant negative relationship for 
CDO issues, and an insignificant positive relationship for MBS issues. This could explain why large and 
small MBS issues are close substitutes. However, for ABS, this evidence may support illiquidity in the 
form of a downward-sloping demand curve. The negative relationship between loan size and spread for 
CDOs means that, on average, larger issues are associated with a price discount. These findings also merit 
greater in-depth analysis than we can provide here, considering the fact that ABS and CDOs exhibit a wide 
variety of assets attached as collateral for the security. Nevertheless, these results are still surprising. 
TRANSACTION SIZE has a significantly negative relationship with spreads for ABS and MBS 
regressions at the 1% level, and an insignificant positive relationship for CDOs. One could interpret a 
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 significant negative relationship between transaction size and spread as evidence of a positive price 
liquidity effect related to the size of the entire issue. 
 # TRANCHES (the number of tranches) has an insignificant relationship with spread across 
MBS and CDO, but significant for ABS.  Thus, we did not find any support that allows the issuers to 
exploit market factors to their advantage via tranching for MBS and CDO; or at least no advantage exists 
that would include a lower spread differential. The significant and positive spread for ABS poses a puzzle: 
investors associate more tranches with an increase in spread. It may be argued that tranches have a positive 
relationship with default so that an originator would benefit from more tranches in the transaction, 
especially in the situation of a higher degree of information asymmetry between originator and investors 
concerning underlying collateral.  Thus, investors could associate an increase in the number of tranches 
with an additional increase in risk, something for which they would require an extra premium.  This is an 
important result which merits more detailed research.  
The dummy variables # LEAD MANAGERS and # RATING AGENCIES behave differently for 
ABS and MBS than for CDO. Whereas spread and number of lead managers are insignificantly and 
negatively related for ABS and significantly for MBS, they have an insignificant positive relationship for 
CDOs. While a clear interpretation of these contrasting results is difficult to provide, one explanation could 
be found in the difference between the evaluation criteria used by investors and capital markets for CDOs 
in comparison with ABS and MBS. CDOs exclusively have their own active asset managers involved with 
the purpose of managing the underlying portfolio, whereas CDOs on average are exposed to higher risk and 
may be more subject to temporary imbalances between cash inflows and outflows. The need for a higher 
number of banks in arranging a CDO would be smaller (see Exhibit 3), with investors possibly associating 
an increase in the number of banks involved in a CDO with increased risk – and extra premium to boot.  
Nevertheless, results for CDOs have proven to be insignificant.  
However, particularly in the case of CDOs, a potential conflict of interest between asset managers 
and investors could arise. As a result, the number of credit rating agencies involved in rating CDOs would 
be able to achieve, ceteris paribus, a more accurate rating, thereby reducing the potential conflict of interest 
and lowering the spread. This is true in our analysis, as the coefficient value for the number of credit rating 
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 agencies indicates that booking a loan tranche with one additional credit rating agency involved decreases 
average spread by 11.7 for CDOs. The average ABS and MBS coefficient is not significant.  
The LOWMATURITY dummy showed a significant, negative relationship with spread for 
CDOs, while we found a negative and insignificant relationship for ABS and MBS. No other security 
category has anything near this sensitivity to short-term debt. This finding suggests that CDOs with a 
maturity of less than 5 years reduce the spread significantly, with 38.3 basis points, in comparison with an 
issue with a maturity between 5 to 15 years. Since, on average, collateral of CDOs is considered more 
risky, lenders could prefer short-term debt to control for the increased collateral volatility, thereby 
demanding a lower premium than what was implied in the credit rating of the particular issue.  
HIGHMATURITY has an insignificant, positive relationship with spread for ABS issues, a 
negative significant relationship for MBS and is insignificant for CDOs. One obvious interpretation is that 
investors in MBS demand a lower premium for issues with a maturity longer than 15 years as compared to 
ABS and CDOs. Thus, long-tenor MBS are less expensive. This finding also merits greater in-depth 
analysis into the nature of the assets than we can provide here. 
Of the remaining variables, the relationship between LOAN TO VALUE is insignificant and 
negative for MBS and insignificant and positive for ABS and CDOs. The expected coefficient sign of loan 
to value is negative, as loans with a lower loan to value ratio (lower tranches) have a lower expected 
recovery rate in case of default than loans with a higher loan to value ratio (higher tranches) and therefore 
require a higher return. Although CDOs present insignificant results, they do demonstrate the largest 
coefficient compared with ABS and MBS.  Apparently, investors associate an increase in loan to value with 
an additional risk premium for CDOs. However, statistical significance across security classes is poor, as 
loan to value is most likely already reflected in the rating of a loan issue. 
The CURRENCY RISK dummy has a significant, positive relationship with the spread for ABS, 
MBS and CDOs after controlling for credit rating. This finding suggests that issues exposed to currency 
risk have higher spreads than other issues not exposed to currency risk - by 34 basis points for ABS, 11 
basis points for MBS and by up to 15 basis points for CDOs.  
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 FIXED has a strong positive relationship with spread for ABS and MBS, and an insignificant 
relationship for CDO. This result can easily be explained since the interest rates on these notes do not 
fluctuate and the notes are typically protected to avoid the risk of rising interest rates. This indicates that 
ABS and MBS borrowers on average have to pay an extra risk premium through fixed-price issues in 
comparison with floating-price issues: by almost 53 basis points for ABS and 25 basis points for MBS.  
The insignificant relationship for CDOs may be explained in two ways. First, it could result from 
the fact that CDOs are especially attractive for fixed-income investors who want diversified high-yield 
bonds without any interest sensitivity. Second, the performance of a typical CDO, in comparison with ABS 
and MBS, depends to a greater degree on its manager's trading ability. Therefore, fixed-rate investors prefer 
to hold a fixed-rate bond with no interest rate sensitivity, because the market value of the security is driven 
solely by collateral performance.  
 
5.3  Regression results: conclusions 
Subsection 5.2 investigated the extent to which the main classes of securities are priced by 
common factors. Our purpose was to analyze the impact of common pricing features on primary market 
spread by security class. We saw that all Chow test statistics were higher than the critical levels, and 
therefore we accepted the hypothesis that the primary market spreads associated with the main security 
classes are influenced differently by common pricing factors. The regression analyses we performed 
suggest that ABS, MBS and CDOs are in fact different instruments, as implied by the differences in impact 
of the pricing factors on the loan spread between these security classes.  
Applying the same pricing estimation model to each security class revealed that the common 
pricing characteristics associated with these classes have a different impact on the primary market spread 
exhibited by the value of the coefficients. We documented, for example, that:  
(1)  the impact of a typical credit rating on the spread differs substantially from 
security class to security class, these differences become bigger as credit ratings 
deteriorate;    
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  (2) credit rating does not provide an unbiased estimate in the determination of 
spreads;  
 (3)  CDOs tend to be more exposed to higher levels of distressed assets, thereby 
dramatically increasing risk from the higher to the lower rating categories;  
(4)  lenders demand lower spreads for MBS with a longer maturity as compared to 
ABS and CDOs; 
 (5) CDOs are much more sensitive to third-party guarantees in comparison with 
ABS and MBS;  
 (6)  lenders tend to offer a higher discount for short-term CDOs in comparison with 
short-term ABS and MBS, after controlling for credit rating. 
A major contribution of our research lies in the fact that the existence of substantial differences 
between security classes in the impact of common pricing variables on the spread could indicate that these 
securities are priced differently. Investment banks in charge of structuring the technical features of certain 
issues may find the estimates a useful tool concerning the size of each variable’s impact on the issuance 
spread by security class. 
 
 
6.  Conclusion 
Choudhry and Fabozzi [2004] mention that the capital market in which the securities are issued 
and traded is composed of three main, distinct categories: ABS, MBS and CDOs. Due to differences in 
assets related to these securities, the relevant pricing factors for these securities should differ, too. We were 
able to examine a total of 3,467 loans (worth €548.85 billion) of which 1,102 (worth €163.90 billion) were 
classified as ABS. MBS issues represent 1,783 issues (worth €320.83 billion) and 582 are CDO issues 
(worth €64.12 billion).  
We have investigated how common pricing factors compare for the main classes of securities. We 
found that most of the common pricing characteristics exhibited by ABS, MBS and CDOs differ 
significantly, and therefore we accepted the hypothesis that the common pricing factors do in fact differ 
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 significantly in value between the main classes of securities. Taking these classes as a whole, we have 
documented that the assets attached as collateral for the securities differ between security classes, but that 
there are also important univariate differences to consider. Furthermore, we saw that all Chow test statistics 
were higher than the critical levels, and therefore we accepted the hypothesis that the primary market 
spreads associated with the main security classes are influenced differently by common pricing factors. 
Applying the same pricing estimation model to each security class revealed that most of the common 
pricing characteristics associated with these classes have a different impact on the primary market spread 
exhibited by the value of the coefficients. The regression analyses we performed suggest that ABS, MBS 
and CDOs are in fact different instruments, as implied by the differences in impact of the pricing factors on 
the loan spread between these security classes.  
 The substantial differences we found between security classes regarding the impact of common 
pricing variables on the spread indicate that these securities are indeed priced differently.  As such, our 
results form an important contribution to current research and to activities in the work field, as the 
estimates concerning the size of each variable’s impact on the issuance spread by security class may stand 
investment banks in good stead in structuring the technical features of certain issues. 
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 Exhibit 1: Common pricing characteristics of asset securitization issues in the full sample compared with those 
in the high-information sample 
 
Panel A: ABS 
(1) Variable of interest (4) Surv. 
Rate
Number Mean Std. Dev. Number Mean Std. Dev.
primary market spread (bp) 1,472 99.2 133.1 1,102 94.1 115.3 74.9%
credit rating class [1-21 weak] 1,939 3.9 3.5 1,102 4.1 3.4 56.8%
loan to value (%) 1,556 18.0% 24.1% 1,102 20.3% 25.2% 70.8%
time to maturity (years) 2,118 11.3 9.8 1,102 13.9 9.9 52.0%
issues with credit enhancement 2,427 7.6% - 1,102 9.0% - 45.4%
loan tranche size (Euro millions) 2,417 150.3 305.1 1,102 180.1 299.1 45.6%
transaction size (Euro millions) 765 475.1 640.1 248 657.1 740.8 32.4%
number of tranches 765 3.2 3.1 248 5.2 3.9 32.4%
number of lead managers 2,417 1.4 0.7 1,102 1.5 0.7 45.6%
number of credit rating agencies 2,207 3.8 0.8 1,102 4.0 0.7 49.9%
retained interest 2,427 4.9% - 1,102 1.7% - 45.4%
loans with fixed rate 2,034 41.4% - 1,102 22.7% - 54.2%
loans with floating rate 2,034 58.6% - 1,102 77.3% - 54.2%
loans with currency risk 2,234 13.3% - 1,102 14.9% - 49.3%
(2) ABS full sample (3) ABS high-information 
sample
 
 
Panel B: MBS 
(1) Variable of interest (4) Surv. 
Rate
Number Mean Std. Dev. Number Mean Std. Dev.
primary market spread (bp) 2,370 73.90 82.36 1,783 73.5 78.1 75.2%
credit rating class [1-21 weak] 2,892 4.0 3.4 1,783 3.9 3.3 61.7%
loan to value (%) 2,718 13.2% 21.0% 1,783 14.1% 2.2% 65.6%
time to maturity (years) 2,619 27.5 14.6 1,783 29.3 14.1 68.0%
issues with credit enhancement 3,169 0.6% - 1,783 0.4% - 56.3%
loan tranche size (Euro millions) 3,147 209.6 394.3 1,783 217.0 335.1 56.7%
transaction size (Euro millions) 760 800.0 731.1 382 837.2 638.4 50.3%
number of tranches 760 5.8 3.6 382 5.8 3.8 50.3%
number of lead managers 3,136 1.6 0.8 1,783 1.6 0.8 49.3%
number of credit rating agencies 2,951 4.1 0.7 1,783 4.3 0.6 60.4%
retained interest 3,169 3.6% - 1,783 1.7% - 56.3%
loans with fixed rate 2,570 13.7% - 1,783 8.4% - 69.4%
loans with floating rate 2,570 86.3% - 1,783 92.6% - 69.4%
loans with currency risk 3,100 15.9% - 1,783 20.7% - 57.5%
(2) MBS full sample (3) MBS high-information 
sample
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Exhibit 1: Common pricing characteristics of asset securitization issues in the full sample compared with those 
in the high-information sample (continued) 
 
Panel C: CDO 
(1) Variable of interest (4) Surv. 
Rate
Number Mean Std. Dev. Number Mean Std. Dev.
primary market spread (bp) 1,453 162.4 167.6 582 163.7 176.9 40.1%
credit rating class [1-21 weak] 1,900 4.6 3.7 582 5.3 3.9 30.6%
loan to value (%) 1,953 17.8% 21.2% 582 18.4% 20.3% 29.9%
time to maturity (years) 1,895 15.1 18.4 582 15.9 16.0 30.7%
issues with credit enhancement 2,504 1.0% - 582 1.2% - 23.2%
loan tranche size (Euro millions)  2,490 127.2 453.4 582 100.8 476.0 23.4%
transaction size (Euro millions) 514 616.1 1,028.6 362 837.6 638.1 70.4%
number of tranches 514 4.9 3.1 362 6.5 2.5 70.4%
number of lead managers 2,469 1.2 0.7 582 1.3 0.5 23.6%
number of credit rating agencies 2,086 3.7 0.7 582 4.1 0.7 27.9%
retained interest 2,504 4.0% - 582 1,0% - 23.2%
loans with fixed rate 1,836 26.1% - 582 13.2 - 31.7%
loans with floating rate 1,836 73.9% 582 86.8% - 31.7%
loans with currency risk 1,248 39.8% - 582 40.4% - 46.6%
(2) CDO full sample (3) CDO high-information 
sample
 
Column 1 represents the common pricing variables. Column 2 gives number, mean and standard deviation associated with each common 
pricing variable in the full sample. Column 3 presents number, mean and standard deviation associated with each common pricing variable in 
the high-information sample. Column 4 presents the survival rate for each variable. The survival rate is calculated as the number of issues in 
the high-information sample divided by the number of issues in the full sample. 
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 Exhibit 2: Credit rating scales 
 
Moody's
Standard & 
Poor's Fitch
Value
1 Aaa AAA AAA
2 Aa1 AA+ AA+
3 Aa2 AA AA
4 Aa3 AA- AA-
5 A1 A+ A+
6 A2 A A
7 A3 A- A-
8 Baa1 BBB+ BBB+
9 Baa2 BBB BBB
10 Baa3 BBB- BBB-
11 Ba1 BB+ BB+
12 Ba2 BB BB
13 Ba3 BB- BB-
14 B1 B+ B+
15 B2 B B
16 B3 B- B-
17 Caa1 CCC+ CCC+
18 Caa2 CCC+ CCC+
19 Caa3 CCC- CCC-
20 - CC CC
21 - D D
Rating agency
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 Exhibit 3: Univariate statistics – pricing features associated with the main security classes compared 
 
 
Panel A: Univariate analysis – continuous variables 
(1) Variable of interest
ABS MBS CDO
primary market spread (bp)
Number 1,472 2,370 1,453
Mean 99.2 73.90 162.4
Median 50.0 45.0 95.0
Min. -55 -5 -2
Max. 1,400.0 700.00 875.0
Std.dev. 133.1 82.36 167.6
credit rating class [1-21 weak]
Number 1,939 2,892 1,900
Mean 3.9 4.0 4.6
Median 1.0 3.0 3.0
Min. 1.0 1.0 1.0
Max. 16.0 15.0 16.0
Std.dev. 3.5 3.4 3.7
loan to value (%)
Number 1,556 2,718 1,953
Mean 18.0% 13.2% 17.8%
Median 6.7% 4.0% 10.0%
Min. 0.0% 0.0% 0.0%
Max. 97.3% 99.9% 100.0%
Std.dev. 24.1% 21.0% 21.2%
time to maturity (years)
Number 2,118 2,619 1,895
Mean 11.3 27.5 15.1
Median 7.2 31.0 9.1
Min. 0.04 0.90 0.05
Max. 61.0 90.1 99.1
Std.dev. 9.8 14.6 18.4
loan tranche size (Euro millions)
Number 2,417 3,147 2,490
Mean 150.3 209.6 127.2
Median 40.5 48.2 25.0
Min. 0.07 0.01 0.10
Max. 6,413.7 4,750.0 10,812.0
Std.dev. 305.1 394.3 453.4
(2) Security class
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 Exhibit 3: Univariate statistics – pricing features associated with the main security classes compared (continued) 
 
 
Panel A: Univariate analysis – continuous variables (continued) 
(1) Variable of interest
ABS MBS CDO
(2) Security class
 
transaction size (Euro millions)
Number 765 760 514
Mean 475.1 800.0 616.1
Median 331.4 600.5 358.8
Min. 0.0 2.3 0.0
Max. 7,307.0 6,637.2 10,812.4
Std.dev. 640.1 731.1 1,028.6
number of tranches
Number 765 760 514
Mean 3.2 5.8 4.9
Median 2.0 5.0 5.0
Min. 1.0 1.0 1.0
Max. 21.0 19.0 28.0
Std.dev. 3.1 3.6 3.1
number of lead managers
Number 2,417 3,136 2,469
Mean 1.4 1.6 1.2
Median 1.0 1.0 1.0
Min. 1.0 1.0 1.0
Max. 5.0 7.0 8.0
Std.dev. 0.7 0.8 0.7
number of credit rating agencies
Number 2,207 2,951 2,086
Mean 3.8 4.1 3.7
Median 3.0 4.0 3.0
Min. 1.0 2.0 2.0
Max. 6.0 6.0 6.0
Std.dev. 0.8 0.7 0.7  
 
 
Panel A provides a univariate analysis for the full sample of asset securitization issues categorized by security class (continuous variables). 
Column 1 represents the common pricing variables. Column 2 presents the values associated with each variable. 
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 Exhibit 3: Univariate statistics – pricing features associated with the main security classes compared (continued) 
 
 
Panel B: Univariate analysis – dummy variables 
(1) Variable of interest
ABS MBS CDO
credit enhancement
N. of issues for which data are available 2,427 3,169 2,504
N. of issues for which dummy = 1 185 19 25
% of total available data 7.6% 0.6% 1.0%
retained issue
N. of issues for which data are available 2,427 3,169 2,504
N. of issues for which dummy = 1 119 114 99
% of total available data 4.9% 3.6% 4.0%
fixed rate issue
N. of issues for which data are available 2,034 2,570 1,836
N. of issues for which dummy = 1 843 351 479
% of total available data 41.4% 13.7% 26.1%
currency risk
N. of issues for which data are available 2,234 3,100 1,248
N. of issues for which dummy = 1 298 493 497
% of total available data 13.3% 15.9% 39.8%
(2) Security class
 
Panel B provides a univariate analysis for the full sample of asset securitization issues categorized by security class (dummy variables). 
Column 1 represents the common pricing variables. Column 2 presents the values associated with each variable. 
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Exhibit 3: Univariate statistics – pricing features associated with the main security classes compared (continued) 
 
 
Panel C: Two-sample t-tests assuming unequal variances 
(1) Variable of interest
ABS versus MBS ABS versus CDO MBS versus CDO 
primary market spread (bp) 6.56 -11.27 -18.78
credit rating class [1-21 weak] -1.43 # -6.17 -5.41
loan to value (%) 6.55 0.43 # -7.16
time to maturity (years) -45.33 -7.99 24.29
credit enhancement (0/1) -12.60 11.54 -1.65 #
loan tranche size (Euro millions) -6.31 2.13 7.17
transaction size (Euro millions) -5.37 -1.58 # 2.49
number of tranches 42.30 -9.52 -10.81
number of lead managers -6.80 11.20 17.79
number of credit rating agencies -17.25 -6.11 22.41
retained interest (0/1) 2.38 1.62 # -0.69 #
fixed rate issue (0/1) 21.61 10.25 -10.11
currency risk (0/1) -2.63 -16.96 -15.59
(2) Security class
 
Panel C presents significance tests for the differences in values between security classes. # indicates that the common pricing variables do 
not differ significantly between the two security classes at the 5% significance level. All other common pricing values are statistically and 
significantly different at the 5% level or higher. 
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 Exhibit 4: Chow test for differences in pricing factors coefficients 
ABS MBS CDO
ABS - -
MBS 8.21 - -
CDO 10.48 29.51 -
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 Exhibit 5: Determinants of asset securitization issues – ABS, MBS and CDO compared 
ABS issues MBS issues CDO issues
Variable Reg. #1 Reg. #2 Reg. #3
CONSTANT 124.92 * 139.11 * 143.66
(2.81) (5.65) (1.26)
RATING = 2 18.69 ** 18.62 * 7.36
(2.14) (4.78) (0.59)
RATING = 3 38.57 * 29.71 * 22.98 **
(5.52) (8.83) (2.31)
RATING = 4 38.59 * 38.98 * 33.54
(3.29) (10.73) (1.65)
RATING = 5 58.34 * 45.54 * 70.70 *
(5.69) (10.02) (4.56)
RATING = 6 69.34 * 52.75 * 64.48 *
(10.64) (15.28) (5.06)
RATING = 7 117.32 * 73.12 * 89.30 *
(6.87) (3.09) (6.48)
RATING = 8 153.00 * 118.64 * 157.39 *
(4.57) (8.62) (7.09)
RATING = 9 178.32 * 126.05 * 167.77 *
(20.07) (28.56) (11.17)
RATING = 10 202.52 * 132.78 * 222.44 *
(11.02) (9.47) (8.52)
RATING = 11 479.67 * 327.74 * 481.29 *
(8.59) (6.60) (8.77)
RATING = 12 427.23 * 386.05 * 429.15 *
(12.94) (24.42) (15.16)
RATING = 13 429.53 * 437.06 * 552.07 *
(4.05) (107.03) (23.03)
LOAN TO VALUE 4.69 -3.71 23.08
(0.66) (-1.32) (1.21)
LOWMATURITY -4.44 -6.47 -38.29 **
(-0.52) (-1.28) (-2.50)
HIGHMATURITY 6.73 -5.02 ** 0.03
(1.34) (-2.00) (0.01)
ENHANCEMENT -5.79 47.07 * -16.98
(-0.98) (5.98) (-1.13)
LOAN SIZE 21.51 * 5.79 -17.93
(3.69) (2.51) (-1.62)
TRANSACTION SIZE -29.38 * -16.29 * 1.33
(-3.73) (-5.21) (0.10)
# TRANCHES 2.79 * 0.26 1.88
(3.75) (0.92) (1.23)
# LEAD MANAGERS -2.39 -3.79 * 7.00
(-0.86) (-3.55) (0.91)
# RATING AGENCIES -0.57 2.26 -11.69 **
(-0.16) (1.58) (-2.16)  
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ABS issues MBS issues CDO issues
Variable Reg. #1 Reg. #2 Reg. #3
 
FIXED 52.69 * 24.80 * 14.32
(8.08) (5.20) (1.25)
RETAINED 5.67 -10.19 -103.88
(0.39) (-1.39) (-1.29)
CURRENCY RISK 34.03 * 11.20 * 15.00 **
(3.19) (3.57) (2.17)
Number of observations 1,102 1,783 582
Adjusted R2 0.76 0.82 0.82
F 107.52 239.10 82.48
 
The dependent variable is defined as the margin yielded by the security at issue above a corresponding benchmark. The dependent variable is 
measured in basis points. The independent variables are as follows: set of thirteen credit-rating dummy variables: CR=1, CR=2, CR=3, 
CR=4, CR=5, CR=6, ….., CR=13, correspond to credit rating: Aaa/AAA, Aa1/AA+, Aa2/AA, Aa3/AA-, A1/A+, A2/A, ….., Ba3/BB-; 
LOAN TO VALUE is the subordination level expressed as a percentage of the transaction’s initial principal balance; LOWMATURITY is 1 
if the issue matures in less than 5 years; HIGHMATURITY is 1 if the loan matures after 15 years; ENHANCEMENT as dummy variable 
takes the value of 1 if the issue has a third-party guarantee in the form of an insurance policy issued by one of the monoline insurance 
companies; LOAN SIZE is the natural log of the issue amount in millions of Euros; TRANSACTION SIZE is the natural log of the size of 
the transaction in Euro millions; # TRANCHES is the number of tranches per transaction; # LEAD MANAGERS is the number of managers 
representing the number of financial institutions participating in the loan issuance management group; # RATING AGENCIES is the number 
of rating agencies involved in rating the loan at the time of issuance; FIXED has a dummy of 1 if the loan issue has a rate that is fixed for the 
life of the loan, zero if the loan has an interest rate that fluctuates depending on the base interest rate (floating rate issue); RETAINED is the 
retained subordinated interest as a beneficial interest in a securitization transaction by the originator; CURRENCY RISK is a dummy 
variable that takes the value of 1 if currency risk occurs. The exhibit shows the coefficient and t-statistic, corrected for heteroscedasticity, in 
parentheses. All dummy variables are zero otherwise; CURRENCY dummy variables and YEAR dummy variables are included but not 
reported in the exhibit. 
* Denote significance at the 1% level.  
** Denote significance at the 5%.  
*** Denote significance at the 10% level. 
 
 
